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Abstract:  We  estimate  the  impact  of  effective  profit  taxation  on  the  financial  leverage  of 
corporations on the basis of a pseudo-panel constructed from corporate tax return micro data for the 
period 1998-2001, a period which saw the introduction of a major corporate tax reform in Germany. 
The financial leverage is measured by the ratio of long-term debt to total capital. Endogeneity of the 
effective corporate tax rate is controlled for by an instrumental variable approach. Our instrument 
for  the  observed  effective  tax  rate  is  the  counterfactual  tax  rate  a  corporation  would  face  in  a 
particular period had there been no endogenous change of its financial structure. This counterfactual 
is obtained from a detailed microsimulation model of the corporate sector based on tax return micro 
data.  We  find  a  statistically  significant  and  relatively  large  positive  effect  of  the  tax  rate  on 
corporate  leverage:  on  average,  an  increase  of  the  tax  rate  by  10  percent  would  increase  the 
financial leverage by about 5 percent. We also find that the debt ratio is less responsive for small 
corporations and for corporations that benefit from various other forms of tax shields, in particular 
depreciation allowances and tax loss carry-forward. However, tax effects do not seem to depend on 
risk, although the level of economic risk does affect corporate leverage.  
 
JEL Classification: G32, G38, H25, H32 
Keywords: financial leverage; financial structure; debt ratio; corporate income taxation; corporate 
tax return data 
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1  Introduction 
The effects of profit taxation on the corporate capital structure, or corporate leverage, have been 
the focus of much theoretical and empirical research in financial economics and public finance (for 
surveys  see,  e.g.,  Graham  2003,  Auerbach  2002).  While  interest  payments  on  debt  lower  a 
company’s profit liable for taxation no similar deduction exists for the interest yield on equity. This 
preferential  treatment  of  debt  over  equity  distorts  companies’  financial  policy.  In  particular, 
companies may excessively rely on debt for tax reasons. Furthermore, as equity generally does not 
constitute an obligation to pay interests on a regular basis, high equity ratios serve as security in 
distressed economic conditions. Boosting equity financing, however, may be undermined by the tax 
advantage of debt over equity through taxation. Understanding to what extent the preferential tax 
treatment of debt distorts companies’ decisions and generates economic inefficiencies is therefore 
not only of substantial theoretical interest but also of great policy relevance. 
Despite extensive research efforts, economists have had  great difficulty providing empirical 
evidence that taxes indeed matter for the financial leverage of corporations. Estimated tax effects 
tend to be rather small, if present at all, and often only indirectly related to the financial leverage 
(see, e.g., Graham 2003 for a critical evaluation), which has led financial economists to doubt the 
empirical relevance of tax factors in corporate financing decisions (see, in particular, Myers 1984). 
There are two main problems empirical researchers face when trying to identify tax effects. First, 
there is often insufficient variation in statutory tax rates either across companies or over time in 
cross-section or time series data. Second, if an effective tax rate is used, this tax variable is likely to 
be endogenous to corporate financing decisions confounding tax-related effects in previous studies. 
In this paper, we estimate the elasticity of the financial leverage to changes in the effective 
corporate  tax  rate  (ETR)  using  a  comprehensive  tax  return  data  set  for  the  German  economy. 
Following Gruber and Saez (2002), who applied this methodology to the estimation of the personal 
income tax elasticity, we control for potential endogeneity bias by instrumenting the observed tax 
rate by the counterfactual tax rate a corporation would face in a particular period had there be no 
endogenous  change  of  corporate  debt.  This  counterfactual  is  obtained  from  a  detailed 
microsimulation model of the corporate sector based on tax return micro data for the years 1998 and 
2001.  This  period  saw  the  introduction  of  a  substantial  tax  reform  which  provides  sufficient 
exogenous variation in the ETR across corporations to identify the elasticity of corporate debt.  
Since the German corporate income tax is proportional to taxable income
1, we cannot rely on 
the variation in statutory tax rates induced by the progressivity of the corporate tax schedule to 
                                                 
1 The US, the UK and Japan tax corporate income in higher income brackets at a higher rate, some European countries 
(e.g., Belgium and the Netherlands) provide a basic allowance for corporate income. Overall, there seems to be a 
tendency to reduce the “progressivity” of the CIT (see, e.g., OECD 2007).     2 
identify tax effects on corporate leverage. Rather, our identification is based on the variation of the 
ETR which also reflects various other tax shields, in particular unused loss carry-forward which has 
become of major quantitative importance for the corporate sector also in the German economy.
2 
The  huge  difference  in  the  amount  of  used  loss  carry-forward  and  other  tax  shields  across 
corporations provides the exogenous variation in the ETR for our identification strategy of the debt 
elasticity.  
The  estimation  is  based  on  the  corporate  income  tax  statistics  and  the  local  business  tax 
statistics that cover all corporations in Germany. While the broad coverage and detailed information 
on various tax shields are distinct advantages, the data set has the drawback that it is not available 
as  a  panel.  For  the  estimation  we  therefore  construct  a  pseudo-panel  for  1998  and  2001  by 
aggregation of the individual-level corporate tax return data into about 1,000 groups defined by 
industry (up to the 5-digit level) and by region. This pseudo panel allows us to control for observed 
and unobserved time-invariant factors, which may be correlated with both the financial leverage and 
the ETR, and to derive at an instrumental variable for the potentially endogenous ETR.  
Instrumental variable estimation of our preferred specification of the regression model yields a 
statistically significant and relatively large point estimate of the average tax elasticity of corporate 
leverage. This estimate implies that a reduction of the (proportional) statutory corporate tax rate by 
10 percent would reduce corporate debt by 5 percent. Compared to previous studies this is a fairly 
large estimate of the financial leverage elasticity. This elasticity estimate also indicates that the 
response of the corporate tax base to changes in the effective tax rate in Germany (see Dwenger and 
Steiner 2008) is to a large extent driven by changes in the corporate leverage. We also find evidence 
for the hypothesis that the debt ratio is less responsive for small corporations, for corporations 
facing higher economic risks, and for corporations that benefit from various other forms of tax 
shields, in particular the amount of unused tax loss carry-forward and depreciation allowances. 
In the next section, we briefly review the empirical literature on the relationship between profit 
taxation  and  corporate  leverage.  Section 3  describes  our  empirical  methodology  to  identify  the 
leverage  elasticity  and  the  construction  of  our  pseudo-panel  used  for  its  estimation.  Estimation 
results for our basic specification of the regression model are summarized and discussed in section 
4.1. Results for alternative specifications allowing tax rate effects to differ by size and risk and by 
the availability of other tax shields are presented in sections 4.2 and 4.3, respectively. Section 5 




                                                 
2  For similar developments in the U.S. see, e.g., Cooper and Knittel (2006) and Altshuler et al. (2008).     3 
2  Previous Empirical Literature 
As  mentioned  in  the  Introduction,  the  older  empirical  literature  failed  to  find  plausible  or 
significant tax effects on the level of debt, i.e. on corporate leverage. There are two main factors 
which may have contributed to this failure: first, the limited time-series variation in the statutory tax 
rate within countries; and second, the endogeneity of the effective tax rate in cross-section and 
panel studies which achieve identification by making use of the cross-section variation in effective 
corporate  tax  rates  within  countries.  The  subsequent  empirical  literature  has  suggested  various 
approaches to account for these factors. In the following we review this literature with the aim to 
make  clear  the  similarities  and  differences  between  the  previous  literature  and  our  empirical 
approach which is described in the next section. 
While tax rates usually change little over time within a country, tax rates vary largely between 
countries.  Rajan  and  Zingales  (1995)  make  use  of  this  cross-country  variation  and  compare 
financial policies across G-7 countries. They find that companies in countries with high corporate 
income taxes use debt more excessively and thereby document a significant effect of corporate 
taxes on debt. Focusing on financing decisions of multinationals, Altshuler and Grubert (2002) and 
Desai, Foley and Hines (2004), among others, find modest tax effects of the host country’s tax rate 
on  the  financing  of  multinationals’  affiliates  abroad.  Similar  results  were  found  by  Huizinga, 
Laeven and Nicodème (2008) for a large sample of European countries, as well as by Mintz and 
Weichenrieder (2005) and Buettner et al. (2006) for German multinationals.   
An alternative identification strategy using cross-section or panel data on corporations within a 
country  is  based  on  the  “substitution  hypothesis”  proposed  by  DeAngelo  and  Masulis  (1980).  
According to this hypothesis, other corporate tax shields, such as depreciation allowances and tax 
loss carry-forwards, may substitute for debt and thus affect the financial leverage elasticity with 
respect to the tax rate.
3 The older empirical literature (see, e.g., Bradley, Jarrell, and Kim 1984, 
Marsh  1982,  Titman  and  Wessels  1988,  Fischer,  Henkel  and  Zechner  1989)  could  not  find 
convincing evidence supporting this hypothesis. MacKie-Mason (1990) argues that this may be due 
to the fact that previous studies analyzed debt ratios, which cumulate decisions made over many 
years, taken under varying circumstances. Instead, he suggests studying incremental decisions to 
issue debt, i.e. on the decision to issue new debt. Furthermore, he argues that the substitution effect 
of  tax  shields  should  be  more  applicable  to  firms  with  a  substantial  probability  of  losing  the 
deductibility of their tax shields (“tax exhaustion hypothesis”).  
                                                 
3  Dammon and Senbet (1986) point out that an increase in investment-related tax shields does not necessarily lead to a 
decrease  in  debt.  They  argue  that  besides  the  substitution  effect  an  income  effect  must  be  considered:  Higher 
investment may lead to both higher output and earnings which turns interest deductions more valuable as tax shields.     4 
Focusing  on  incremental  financial  decisions  and  estimating  a  probit  model,  MacKie-Mason 
shows that, in the US, companies with high tax shields and a high probability of facing a zero tax 
rate are indeed less likely to finance by debt. Dhaliwal, Trezevant und Wang (1992) and Trezevant 
(1992) also find that non-debt tax shields such as accelerated depreciations lead to a lower debt ratio 
if  companies  face  a  large  risk  of  a  tax  rate  of  zero.  This  result  was  also  replicated  by  Cloyd, 
Limberg and Robinson (1997) as well as by Ayers, Cloyd and Robinson (2001).  
There is a potentially severe endogeneity bias in empirical estimates relying on the variation of 
after-financing tax rates across corporations to identify tax effects on financial leverage. This bias 
occurs because corporations with substantial debt have large interest deductions, which reduce their 
taxable income and their after-financing tax rate. There have been various attempts in the literature 
to account for this spurious correlation and the resulting endogeneity of the effective tax rate. 
Shevlin  (1990)  and  Graham  (1996)  use  company  specific  simulated  marginal  tax  rates  to 
identify tax rate effects on corporate leverage. They calculate simulated tax rates based upon the 
forecasted future stream of taxable income and the actual tax-code formulas. Also using simulated 
before-financing tax rates, as implied by theory, Graham, Lemmon and Schallheim (1998) for the 
first time document a positive relation between debt levels and the corporate tax rate. Alworth and 
Arachi (2001) follow the Graham-Shevlin simulation methodology and provide evidence on the 
relationship between corporate taxes and debt using panel data on incremental financing decisions 
of Italian companies. 
Using  a  difference-in-difference  estimator  and  variation  induced  by  the  progressivity  of  the 
corporate tax system in the U.S., Gordon and Lee (2001) estimate an average elasticity of debt with 
respect to corporate taxation of about 0.15. Identification of tax effects is based on the strong and 
non-testable “common trend” assumption, i.e. unobserved time varying factors affecting corporate 
debt must not differ between corporations affected by the reforms. Furthermore, these estimates are 
specific  to  the  analyzed  reforms  and  it  is  not  clear  whether  they  can  be  generalized  to  other 
situations.  
Gordon and Lee also find that tax effects for both small and large firms are significantly larger 
that for medium-sized companies, for which the estimated leverage elasticity is not significantly 
different from zero. Furthermore, the elasticity of debt may also vary with economic risk because 
the asymmetric treatment of profits and gains discourage borrowing if companies face larger risks 
(see, e.g., MacKie-Mason 1990, Auerbach 1985, Strebulaev 2007), which in turn may also affect 
estimated  tax  effects  on  corporate  leverage.  Thus  in  the  estimation  of  tax  effects  on  financial 
leverage it seems important to account for both the endogeneity of the effective tax rate and the 
potential interactions between tax effects and the size of corporations as well as the economic risks 
they face.     5 
3  Empirical Methodology  
3.1 Identification and estimation 
We want to estimate the elasticity of the financial leverage with respect to the average effective 
tax rate, ETR. The financial leverage will be measured by the ratio of debt to total equity. Our 
measure of the ETR is the ratio of the corporate income tax assessed to Earnings Before Interest, 
Taxes and Depreciation (EBITD) in a given year. EBITD thus measures profit liable to corporate 
income taxation before the use of various tax shields, i.e. before the deduction of interest payments, 
of tax losses carried forward or carried back, and before the deduction of depreciation allowances. 
EBITD can be calculated from our tax return data by adding interest payments and depreciation 
allowances to Adjusted Gross Income (AGI), see Appendix A2.
4   
For our analysis, a relatively broad measure of profit is important to take interdependencies 
between different tax shields into account when analyzing tax effects on corporate leverage. For a 
given level of current profits, corporations with tax loss carry-forward, for instance, may face very 
different ETR compared to those corporations that do not possess a stock of previously accrued 
losses. As we show below, it is of great importance to account especially for the use of loss carry-
forward in the calculation of the ETR.
5 The variation in the amount of used loss carry-forward 
across corporations also provides one important source of exogenous variation in the ETR for our 
identification  strategy.  Other  sources  of  variation  are  interest  payments  and  depreciation 
allowances. 
The main methodological problem is that the elasticity of financial leverage with respect to the 
ETR is unlikely to be identified by a simple regression of log(debt ratio) on log(ETR), for two 
reasons. First, unobserved time-invariant factors which may be correlated with both the financial 
leverage and the ETR could confound the elasticity estimate. These factors may include firm-size 
effects (see, e.g., Lemmon, Roberts and Zender 2008) and persistent inter-industry differences in 
leverage ratios as already documented by, e.g., Bradley, Jarrell and Kim (1984). Second, spurious 
correlation between the debt ratio and the ETR may be induced by the relation of the corporate 
income  tax  assessed  and  the  amount  of  used  tax  loss  carry-forward.  Furthermore,  depreciation 
                                                 
4 We do not have to add a potential tax loss carry-forwards as the Adjusted Gross Income is the profit before the use of 
tax losses carried forward. 
5  Bach and Dwenger (2007) show that the volume of yet unused losses from the past in the German corporate sector 
has increased from Euro 128.3 billion in 1992 to Euro 380.2 billion in 2001, which amounts to about 330% of 
corporate profits in 2001. Similar results for the US are reported by Cooper and Knittel (2006) who also report that 
large stocks of net operating losses have been generated in the US in this period which are highly concentrated over a 
relatively small number of companies.     6 
allowances not only affect the corporation’s tax assessed, but may also be correlated with its debt 
ratio, thereby inducing spurious correlation between the corporation’s debt ratio and its ETR.
6  
Whilst it seems therefore impossible to identify the financial leverage elasticity with respect to 
the ETR on the basis of a single cross section, we argue that this elasticity can be identified by 
taking advantage of the pseudo-panel structure of our corporate tax return data and changes to the 
corporate  tax  system  introduced  by  the  Tax  Relief  Act  (Steuerentlastungsgesetz)  in  the  period 
1998-2001. Our data come from corporate tax returns and from local business tax returns covering 
this period. Since these data are only available as single cross sections, we construct a pseudo-panel 
for the estimation, as described in Section 3.2.1. We control for potential endogeneity bias by, first, 
accounting for fixed effects and, second, by instrumenting the ETR following the methodology 
which Gruber and Saez (2002) proposed for the estimation of the personal income tax elasticity. 
Our identification strategy consists of instrumenting a corporation’s ETR for 2001 by the simulated 
ETR the corporation would face in 2001 if its debt ratio had not changed endogenously between 
1998 and 2001. Thereby, we only use changes in the tax law and macroeconomic effects exogenous 
to the individual corporation to identify the elasticity of debt with respect to the effective tax rate.  
The Tax Relief Act significantly reduced the statutory corporate income tax rate: In 1998, the 
corporate income tax in principle amounted to 45 percent for retained earnings and to 30 percent for 
distributed earnings while the tax rate was generally reduced to 25 percent in 2001.
7 It changed the 
taxation of dividends from the tax credit method (“imputation method”) to the half-income method 
and thereby also affected personal income taxation.
8 The reform also broadened the tax base by 
lowering depreciation allowances, by introducing the requirement to reinstate original values, and 
by cutting the use of a tax loss carry-back. As the tax reform did not affect corporations equally, we 
observe substantial variation in the change of their effective tax rates, due to the following factors: 
First, every year a share of 20 percent of German corporations use a tax loss carry-forward or a 
tax  loss  carry-backward  to  offset  current  profits.  These  corporations  do  not  pay  any  corporate 
income tax and thus have an effective tax rate of zero which remains unaffected by changes in the 
                                                 
6  If fixed assets may be used as collateral for debt, depreciation allowances and the debt ratio are likely to be positively 
correlated since the amount of depreciation allowances and the value of fixed assets are positively correlated.  
7 Corporations are also liable to the local business tax (Gewerbesteuer). This tax is levied on an adjusted profit measure 
(including a share of interest payments on long-term debt) at a rate which varies across municipalities (for details, see 
Bach et al. 2008, Fossen and Bach 2008). In general, the local business tax paid by a corporation is a deductible 
expense. Since there was no change in the local business tax between 1998 and 2001 and the municipality specific 
rates hardly changed in this period (German Federal Statistical Office 1998, 2001), we have not taken it into account 
in our ETR simulation.  
8  Unfortunately,  we  do  not  have  any  information  about  a  corporation’s  shareholders.  We  neither  know  their 
participation quota nor do we have any knowledge about other sources of income or about their personal income tax. 
As personal income taxation in Germany is highly progressive (see, e.g., Bach, Corneo and Steiner 2008) and as 
taxation  partly  depends  on  the  participation  quota  this  lack  of  information  prevents  us  from  including  personal 
income taxation into our analysis. To simplify the analysis we do not include the solidarity surcharge which amounts 
to 5.5 percent in 1998 and 2001. As the solidarity surcharge is a proportional surcharge on the corporate income tax 
assessed, omitting the surcharge should not influence our results.      7 
statutory tax rate. Note that the use of tax loss carry-forward is not at the corporation’s discretion 
because unused tax loss carry-forward has to be set off in the full amount against current profits.  
Second, the statutory and effective tax rate in 1998 was dependent on the ratio between retained 
and  distributed  earnings:  A  corporation  which  completely  abstained  from  the  distribution  of 
earnings was taxed at the corporate tax rate of 45 percent; whereas a corporation which distributed 
its whole profit was subjected to a corporate income tax rate of 30 percent only. The splitting of the 
tax rate is a specific feature of the tax credit method, which was abolished by the Tax Relief Act; 
since 2001, the tax rate on corporate income is uniform and does not depend on a corporation’s 
payout ratio.
9 This implies that the reduction in the effective tax rate was much larger for those 
corporations which retained most of their earnings than for the corporations distributing their whole 
profit. 
Third, some corporations were subject to reduced statutory corporate income tax rates in 1998. 
Mutual insurance societies, private foundations, and business enterprises of a public corporation 
benefited from a reduced tax rate of 42 percent in 1998. At the same time a flat tax of 25 percent 
applied to different sources of foreign income. The Tax Relief Act, by contrast, does not provide 
any  reductions  in  statutory  tax  rates  but  equally  applies  the  tax  rate  of  25  percent  to  every 
corporation. As a result, the reduction in the statutory and in the effective tax rate between 1998 and 
2001 was smaller for all those corporations which benefited from reduced taxation in the past.
10  
Fourth, the change in the effective tax rate also depends on the asset structure. This means, for 
instance, that corporations with large real investments in both years saw their tax base broadened in 
2001 because of lower depreciation allowances for new acquired goods compared to 1998.  
And fifth, corporations with a fiscal year differing from the calendar year only switched to the 
half income method and the lower tax rate in 2002. In 2001, they were still taxed under the tax 
credit method and had to pay a tax rate of 40 percent. This means that the reduction in the effective 
tax rate for these particular corporations was much smaller than for the ones taxed according to the 
half income method in 2001.
11  
Simulated  tax  liabilities  and  effective  tax  rates  are  computed  using  the  business  taxation 
microsimulation model BizTax.
12 First, EBITD and all income related components of the 1998 
                                                 
9  Under the tax-credit method the tax burden on the corporate level is only meant as a mean to ensure taxation of 
capital income and is credited against the personal income tax of the shareholder. Under the half income method the 
corporate income tax is definite. Half of the dividends are additionally subject to personal income tax. 
10 Some corporations even saw their tax rate rising: Operators of merchant ships in the international bodies of water 
were liable for a reduced rate of 22.5 percent in 1998; in 2001, the universal tax rate of 25 percent applied. 
11 Blasch and Weichenrieder (2007) present the transitional rules and analyse whether listed corporations align their 
fiscal year to the calendar year due to this rule. 
12 BizTax is a microsimulation model for business taxation in Germany based on official tax return data developed at 
DIW Berlin in cooperation with the Federal Ministry of Finance (see Bach et al. 2008). In addition to a detailed local 
business tax module, it also contains a CIT simulation module which replicates the corporate income tax assessed by     8 
cross  section  are  aged  to  2001  values  using  a  nominal  growth  rate  which  is  exogenous  to  the 
individual corporation. There are 13 different inflation parameters for different sources of income 
(profits and losses, dividends and income from interest, differentiated by financial and non-financial 
corporations).
13 Using BizTax we then simulate the corporate tax liability according to the corporate 
income tax law 2001 based on the inflated income components. The simulated ETR for 2001 is 
obtained by relating the simulated tax liability for 2001 to the inflated EBITD of 1998.  
One  might  be  concerned  that  this  simulated  ETR  is  not  completely  exogenous  for  those 
corporations which offset part (or the whole) of their profits in 1998 against losses from the past or 
from 1999 (loss carry-back) because the amount of profits that can be offset against losses from 
other  periods  is  a  function  of  the  tax  rules.  The  Tax  Relief  Act  broadened  the  tax  base  and 
consequently increased profits liable for taxation.
14 This had two implications: first, a rise in the 
effective tax rate, and second the need of a larger volume of losses from other periods to offset a 
higher profit. The ability to offset a higher profit resulting from the tax reform could be related to 
unobserved factors which may also influence the debt ratio. To address this potential endogeneity, 
we inflate the amount of profits which is offset against losses from other periods in 1998 and use 
this amount as an upper limit for the profits that can be offset against losses in our simulation of a 
corporation’s ETR for 2001.
15 In a similar vein, we use the inflated amount of allowable deductions 
that are effectively used in 1998 when we simulate the corporation’s ETR for 2001. 
In  Germany,  40  percent  of  all  corporations  report  a  negative  AGI,  and  this  share  slightly 
decreased between 1998 and 2001 (see Appendix A3). Our tax return data unfortunately do not 
contain  information  which  would  allow  us  to  model  these  losses.  We  therefore  restrict  our 
regression analysis to corporations with positive AGI and try, in an alternative model specification, 
to  control  potential  selection  effects  by  including  the  change  in  the  share  of  corporations  with 
positive profits within groups in the observation period.  
In the estimation we also control for other factors which might be correlated with both the debt 
ratio  and  the  ETR.  First,  we  estimate  the  regression  of  log(debt  ratio)  on  log(ETR)  in  first 
differences allowing for group-fixed effects which may be correlated with the ETR. Second, we 
control for time-varying factors including the number of corporations within a group and the share 
                                                                                                                                                                  
tax authorities for more than 99 percent of all corporations; these corporations account for more than 99 percent of the 
overall corporate income tax revenue. BizTax can be used to simulate the corporate income tax liability of each 
corporation under past regulations, under the current law as well as under different tax reform scenarios. Currently the 
model does not predict behavioral responses of companies which may be triggered by tax reforms, e.g. changes in 
financing and investment decisions or entries and exits of firms. 
13  These  parameters  were  computed  in  such  a  way  that  inflated  profits  and  interests  reflect  the  changes  in  the 
corresponding aggregates in the national accounts and the Bundesbank corporate balance sheet statistics. 
14 Profit refers to Adjusted Gross Income which is the profit liable for corporate income taxation before the use of tax 
losses carried forward. 
15  Since  our  microsimulation  tax  model  does  not  include  a  switching  rule  between  loss  and  profit,  a  corporation 
reporting a profit in 1998 is assumed also to do so in 2001.     9 
of corporations still taxed under the tax credit method in 2001. These variables should also control 
for  changes  within  groups  in  the  observation  period  which  could  affect  the  efficiency  of  our 
estimates, in particular the standard error of the estimated elasticity of the debt ratio.  
Financial leverage may also depend on corporate size and on the economic risks corporations 
face. We control the effect of corporate size on financial leverage by the average amount of capital, 
which we measure at the start of our observation period in order to avoid the potential endogeneity 
of this variable.
 We measure economic risk by the variation coefficient of sales. This risk measure is 
calculated using sales information from the value added tax (VAT) statistics of the German Federal 
Statistical Office from 1998 to 2005. Sales information is available at the same level of aggregation 
as the one used for the construction of our pseudo-panel data. Descriptive statistics of the variation 
coefficient and other control variables are contained in Appendix A3.
16 
Using  the  pseudo  panel  described  in  the  previous  section  and  taking  first  differences  of 
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where g indicates the industry/region group, a is a constant, b is the elasticity of debt we want 
to estimate, g and d  are column vectors of regression coefficients, zg contains our measures of 
corporate size and economic risk as defined above, and Dxg is a column vector composed of first 
differences of the time-varying control variables, and ug = ug,2001-ug,1998 is a first-differenced error 
term, which may or may not be serially correlated. 
Assuming the b coefficient can be consistently estimated by an IV regression based on equation 
(1),  it  measures  the  elasticity  of  corporate  debt  with  respect  to  the  ETR,  i.e. 
( ) ( )   / /   b º D D ´ debt ratio ETR ETR debt ratio .  b=0  implies  that  the  debt  ratio  does  not  react  to 
changes in the effective tax rate at all; b=1 indicates that a decrease in the effective tax rate of one 
percent  decreases  the  debt  ratio  by  one  percent.  We  will  not  only  estimate  b  for  the  whole 
population of companies but also estimate separate elasticities by size, by risk and by characteristics 
that may be related to other tax shields, such as generosity of depreciation allowances or the amount 
of unused tax loss carry-forward.  
 Since the ETR is not under the direct control of the government, the elasticity of the financial 
leverage with respect to the statutory tax rate (t), which is under its direct control, is the more 
interesting  quantity  from  a  policy  perspective.  This  elasticity  is  related  to  b    by  the  relation 
                                                 
16 We use the coefficient of variation rather than the variance of sales to account for differences in the volume of sales 
across  industries.  For  the  purpose  of  a  more  intuitive  interpretation  of  our  estimation  results,  we  normalize  the 
coefficient of variation by its standard error in the estimation.     10 
  , , t t h b h = ´ debt ratio ETR , where  ( ) ( ) , / / ETR t ETR ETR h t t º D D ´ . If deductions and allowances D were 
proportional to EBITD with factor of proportionality d, and in the absence of loss carry-forward and 
loss carry-back, ETR = (1-d)´t and  , 1. t h = ETR  Thus, a given percentage change in the statutory tax 
rate would translate into a proportional change of debt with the factor of proportionality given by b, 
which needs to be estimated econometrically. In case deductions are not proportional to EBITD, or 
in  the  presence  of  loss  carry-forward  and  loss  carry-back,  an  estimate  of  the  elasticity 




3.2.1  Construction of a pseudo-panel from corporate tax return data  
The German corporate income tax return data and the local business tax statistics we use in this 
study are provided by the German Federal Statistical Office every three years.
17 The latest year 
currently available is 2001. We restrict our analysis to the period 1998-2001. Although tax return 
data are also available for 1995, there was no tax reform between this year and 1998 affecting 
corporate taxation which we could use for our analysis. The year 1992, the only other year for 
which  micro  data  on  tax  returns  is  available,  could  not  be  included  in  our  analysis  because 
classification of industries was changed between 1992 and 1998, and it turned out impossible to 
classify industries in the data set for 1992 comparably to those used in 1998 and 2001, which is a 
requisite for the construction of the pseudo panel data. 
The  micro  data  on  corporate  tax  returns  represent  all  corporations  subject  to  the  German 
corporate income tax, which means nearly 740,000 firms in 1998 and about 810,000 in 2001. The 
data are constructed from all tax returns filed in a given year and provide information on more than 
100 items that are relevant for calculating the corporate income tax. Information on tax loss carry-
forwards and on the corporate income tax assessed is also part of the dataset. In the dataset the 
amount of equity capital is recorded at the individual corporate level as the sum of retained earnings 
since 1977 and contributions to capital as far as they occurred after the company was founded. 
Furthermore, it records information on firms’ characteristics such as industry, region, and legal 
form.  
                                                 
17 Individual data have been made anonymous. Researchers have access to the data through the research centres of the 
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Information  about  interest  on  long-term  debt  is  not  available  in  the  corporate  income  tax 
statistics but can be derived from the local business tax statistics which cover the same population 
of corporations and are available for the same years as the corporate tax statistics. Similarly to the 
corporate income tax statistics, the local business tax statistics are constructed from all tax returns 
filed  for  local  business  taxation.
18  The  data  set  includes  information  on  fixed  assets  and,  most 
importantly for our analysis, information on interest payments on long-term debt as half of these 
interest payments is liable to the local business tax. The definition of long-term debt is quite broad 
including debt which is not paid back within 12 months and debt which is taken out to improve 
business operations or to expand.  
Tax  return  data  offer  several  distinct  advantages  compared  to  accounting  data.  First,  they 
provide a broad coverage of the corporate sector. Second, they record the corporate income tax 
actually assessed, together with information on tax shields such as depreciation allowances.
19 Third, 
they also contain certain components important for the calculation of the effective tax rate like the 
actual  and  potential  amount  of  loss  carry-forward.  On  the  other  hand,  there  are  also  some 
disadvantages of these data. In particular, we can only use the 1998 and 2001 cross-sections for our 
purpose and these data are currently not available as a panel. We, therefore, had to construct a 
pseudo-panel data set based on these two cross-sections. And, even more important for our analysis, 
we do not observe corporate income tax assessed and debt within one single tax statistic. Since the 
two statistics cannot be matched at the micro level we have used our  aggregation scheme  and 
additionally information on profit deciles to impute interest payments from the local business tax 
statistics. 
For the construction of the pseudo-panel data set, we have grouped corporations according to 
their industries and the regional affiliation of their headquarters, where the lowest level of region is 
defined  at  the  level  of  the  16  German  federal  states  (Bundeslaender).  We  chose  these  criteria 
because both a corporation’s industry and headquarter are supposed to remain unchanged over a 
short time horizon, i.e. their location decision is not likely to be influenced by the tax reform we 
analyze here. Grouping by industry is also natural because some of the variation in taxation rules 
takes place at the industry level.  
We aggregated the micro data into groups by applying the following sequential procedure (see 
Appendix A1): First, we assessed the number of corporations within each industry at the two-digit 
level in the 2001 cross section data. For groups with a large number of corporations at this level we 
                                                 
18 The local business tax statistics also include non-incorporated firms that we dropped from the data set. 
19 Information on depreciation allowances is pure statistical information (form ST) and not necessary for corporate 
income taxation. Unlike variables important to taxation, items in form ST are not verified by fiscal authorities. We 
therefore check the statements upon plausibility, exclude implausible values, and impute depreciation allowances for 
corporations which did not fill in form ST. We imputed depreciation allowances on the basis of our aggregation 
scheme which will be introduced in the following and which we additionally differentiated into profit deciles.     12 
checked the number of corporations at the three-digit level. If there were more than 50 corporations 
at this level, we checked whether the industry could be disaggregated to the three-digit level given 
the requirement that there are at least 50 corporations within the resulting groups.
20 If this was not 
the case, we kept the group at the two-digit level. In this vein, we proceeded to the five-digit level. 
As it turned out, some groups are quite large even at the five-digit level, including several thousands 
of corporations. In that case we used regional affiliation as subordinate classification criterion and 
further differentiated the groups between Eastern and Western Germany, and if possible between 
federal states as well. By this procedure each corporation was attributed to one of 1,137 groups. The 
same classification of groups was applied to the 1998 cross section.
21 
 
3.2.2  Financial leverage and the effective tax rate 
We measure the financial leverage by a corporation’s ratio of debt to total capital. Total capital 
is calculated as the sum of debt, equity and the legal minimum deposit which amounts to 25,000 
euros for private limited liability companies and to 50,000 euros for public companies.
22 As we do 
not have information on debt in the corporate income tax statistics we impute the information from 
the local business tax statistics.
23 The imputation takes place on the aggregation level of our pseudo-
panel which we further differentiate into profit deciles to take differences in size into account. 
Using the debt ratio is appropriate in our study because we consider all corporations and do not 
restrict our analysis to those that issue new debt (for a discussion see Graham 1999).  
Our measure of the effective tax rate, ETR, is calculated for each corporation as the ratio of the 
corporate income tax assessed to its EBITD as defined in Section 3.1.
24 It differs from the statutory 
corporate  tax  rate  by  the  difference  between  EBITD  and  Taxable  Income,  which  is  driven  by 
different tax shields. In case the EBITD equals zero, the ETR is also set equal to zero. Corporations 
with a negative AGI in a particular year are excluded from the following analysis. The reason for 
                                                 
20 As a robustness check we also constructed a pseudo panel with a minimum group size of 40 and 45, respectively. We 
find that, while the number of groups slightly increases with a lower minimum group size (plus 28 and 2 groups, 
respectively), our results remain unchanged. 
21 We thereby took into account that the classification of industries was partly changed between 1998 and 2001 by 
matching the old industry identifier to the new one. Since this was not always possible, we rearranged a few groups in 
a way to make the data sets for the two years comparable. We exclude those observations for which the industry is 
unknown or obviously erroneous. Revealing the industry is compulsory but leaves taxes for a given corporation 
unchanged; it is unlikely that there is any systematic concealment of the industry and therefore discarding those 
observations should not bias our results. We also drop all private households in the dataset because they were only 
partly included in the 1998 dataset and are not the focus of the present study. 
22  We do  not  have  information  on  initial  deposits.  In  case  initial  deposits  exceed  the  legal  minimum  deposit,  we 
underestimate total capital. 
23 The local business tax statistics contain information on interest payments for long term debt. Using average interest 
rates for firm credits, this allows us to infer long term debt. 
24  Since  our  measure  of  EBITD  is  based  on  tax  information  and  does  not  include  earned  interest,  it  is  not  fully 
congruent with the usual measure which is deduced from corporate balance-sheet data and also corrects for earned 
interest.     13 
excluding these cases is that the tax return data provide no information on the determinants of 
current losses which could be used to predict future losses. As mentioned earlier we control for 
potential selection effects by including the change in the share of corporations reporting positive 
profits. The ETR is calculated at the individual level for 1998 and 2001 and then aggregated to the 
group  level  of  the  pseudo-panel  structure  described  in  the  previous  sub-section,  where  the 
aggregation takes into account differences in group size.  
Appendix 3 shows that the average level of debt across all corporations increased from about 
1,230 to 1,405 thousand €, which amounts to about 13 percent between 1998 and 2001, but only by 
about  5  percent  for  corporations  with  non-negative  AGI.  In  the  same  period,  average  equity 
declined by almost 5 percent for all corporations but only by 3 percent for companies reporting a 
non-negative AGI. For these latter corporations the average debt ratio increased slightly form 0.567 
to 0.575. At the same time, the ETR for corporations with non-negative AGI declined from 15.2 to 
9.5 percent, compared to a drop of the statutory tax rate of 20 percentage points (from 45 percent in 
1998 to 25 percent in 2001) for most corporations.  
 
4  Estimation Results 
4.1 Average tax effects on financial leverage 
Table 1 reports OLS  and  IV  regression results for average tax effects  on financial leverage 
based on equation (1) in Section 3.1.
25 To account for heteroskedasticity due to differences related 
to group size and possibly also serial correlation of error terms we report robust standard errors of 
estimated coefficients in all regressions.   
As shown in column (1), the simple correlation of changes in the corporate capital structure, 
measured by the debt ratio, and the ETR between 1998 and 2001 is negative and significant (two-
sided test, t-value of -2.6). This correlation simply  reflects the fact, mentioned in the previous 
section, that the debt ratio slightly increased while the ETR declined in the observation period. The 
negative correlation between these two variables becomes even stronger if control variables are 
added.  
For the reasons mentioned in section 3.1, we would not expect OLS regressions of the change in 
debt ratio on the change of the ETR to identify the elasticity of debt. In fact, standard Hausman-Wu 
endogeneity tests strongly indicate that ETR is an endogenous variable and OLS estimates of the 
                                                 
25 Since the ratio of long-term debt is zero even at the group level in a few cases, which we couldn’t have used in the 
estimation  of  the  specification  given  above,  we  have  approximated  log(debt  ratiog,2001/debt  ratiog,1998)  and 
log(ETRg,2001/ETRg,1998)  by,  respectively,  [(debt  ratiog,2001-debt  ratiog,1998)/.5(debt  ratiog,2001+debt  ratiog,1998)]  and 
[(ETRg,2001-ETRg,1998)/.5(ETRg,2001+ETRg,1998)]. A sensitivity check shows that restricting the sample to groups with 
positive a debt ratio and estimating the log-log specification given above does not significantly change estimation 
results.     14 
elasticity are inconsistent. In particular, inclusion of the residual from a first-stage regression of 
log(ETRg,2001/EGRg,1998) on the control variables Dxg in the structural equation yields a t-value of     
-5.7; alternatively, a standard Hausman test of endogeneity of the ETR in equation (1) turns out 
significant at the 1 percent-level (p-value=0.000).  
Before we comment on the IV estimation results in Table 1, we report the results of the first-
stage regression with the predicted ETR as our instrument for the ETR actually observed in 2001. 
As shown in Appendix A4, the simple correlation between the relative change in the ETR actually 
observed and the one obtained by instrumenting ETR 2001 in this expression by the simulated ETR 
for 2001 is quite strong. In the first-stage regression including all control variables, the R
2 is almost 
0.32 and the coefficient of our instrument has  t-statistic of about 14.  To explicitly test for the 
relevance of the instruments in our multivariate setting, we calculate the Partial R² regarding our 
instrument as suggested by Shea (1997) and Godfrey (1999), which yield a Partial R² of about 0.15. 
This clearly shows that our instrument is indeed highly correlated with the change in the actually 
observed ETR and that our IV estimation is not likely to suffer from the ubiquitous weak instrument 
problem (see, e.g., Stock et al. 2002).  
Table 1:  Regression results explaining the relationship between changes in financial leverage and the 
effective tax rate  
Dependent variable: log(debt ratiog,2001/debt ratiog,1998) 
    OLS    IV 
    (1)  (2)    (3)  (4)  (5) 
log(ETRg,2001/ETRg,1998)    -0.115 
(0.044) 
-0.182 






share  of  corporations  under  the  tax  credit 
method 
  -  0.112 




change in the number of corporations in the 
group 
  -  0.177 




dummy indicating groups which exclusively 
contain firms located in Western Germany 
  -  -0.053 




variation coefficient of sales / standard 
deviation of the variation coefficient 
  -  -0.057 




log(equityg,1998)    -  0.055 




change in the share of firms reporting non-
negative AGI 
  -  -    -  -  -0.736 
(0.310) 
constant    -0.039 
(0.016) 
-0.813 







2    0.014  0.108    -  -  - 
Number of observations    1,029  1,029    1,029  1,029  1,029 
Note:  The instrument for log(ETRg,2001/ETRg,1998) is log(PETRg,2001/ETRg,1998) with PETRg,2001 the simulated ETR as 
described  in  the  text.  Heteroskedasticity-consistent  robust  (Huber-White)  standard  errors  are  reported  in 
parentheses. 
Sources:  Own calculations based on German Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the Länder, corporate 
income tax statistics 1998 and 2001, value added tax statistics 1998 to 2005, local business tax statistics 1998 
and 2001. 
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As a benchmark, column (3) reports IV estimation results without further control variables. The 
estimated elasticity of corporate debt now becomes positive, with a point estimate of .46, which is 
statistically different from zero at the 1 percent level (two-sided test, t-value of 3.86). Adding the 
control variables to this regression leaves the point estimate of the estimated elasticity in column (4) 
virtually unchanged but slightly increases its estimated standard error.
26 In column (5) we report 
estimation results with the change of the share of corporations with non-negative AGI within groups 
included as an additional variable. This variable should control the potential selection bias resulting 
from  the  exclusion  of  corporations  with  negative  AGI  in  the  estimation.  If  this  selection  is 
determined by fixed group effects only, our first-difference estimation controls for it. However, it 
cannot be ruled out that the factors affecting this selection have been changing in the observation 
period. Since we do not observe factors which might be correlated with time-varying selection we 
cannot control for this by a formal selectivity correction, i.e. by the standard Heckman selection 
procedure. We can, however, approximate the selection term by the average probability of non-
negative AGI in a particular group, i.e. by the share of corporations that report a non-negative AGI 
in a given year. Estimation results for this specification in column (5) show that this variable is 
significant but hardly affects the elasticity estimate; the point estimate increases to .54.  
As discussed in section 3.1, from a policy perspective the elasticity of the financial leverage 
with respect to the statutory tax rate (t), which is related to b by the relation 
  , , t t h b h = ´ debt ratio ETR , is 
of special interest. Since deductions are not proportional to EBITD, and because of the importance 
of loss carry-forward, an estimate of hETR,t is required. Using our corporate tax microsimulation 
model BizTax we find hETR,t = 0.983.
27 Therefore, we may conclude that, on average, our estimate 
of b  is virtually the same as that for the elasticity of the financial leverage with respect to the 
statutory tax rate. Thus, our IV estimates do suggest a relatively large average elasticity of the 
corporate leverage, as measured by the debt ratio, to tax changes with a point estimate of about 0.5 
and a 95% confidence band of 0.25-0.83. 
This is a large effect also relative to the effects of the other economic variables included in the 
model. Whereas the size of the average corporation in an industry/region group has no significant 
effect on financial leverage, an increase in the variation of sales by one standard error reduces the 
debt  ratio  by  about  7  percentage  points.  Given  that  this  change  means  a  doubling  of  our  risk 
                                                 
26 Using the lagged ETR as an instrument instead yields a t-statistic of about -3.89 for its coefficient in the first-stage 
regression including all control variables; the R
2 of this regression is .21 and the Partial R² regarding this instrument is 
about  0.015.  For  specification  (5)  in  Table 1,  the  point  estimate  for  the  b  coefficient  using  the  lagged  ETR  as 
instrument for the change of the ETR is .378 with a very large standard error of .529. Thus, the lagged value of the 
ETR seems to be a rather weak instrument.   
27 The simulations assume that any response of a tax rate change is already accounted for by our estimated elasticity of 
corporate debt.     16 
measure (the sample mean of this variable is about 1, see Appendix A3) and given that the average 
debt ratio is about 57 percent in the sample, this is a relatively modest effect.
28 
4.2 Tax effects by corporate size and risk 
Following  the  reasoning  in  the  empirical  literature  –  see  section  2  –  the  financial  leverage 
elasticity may differ by firm size and the economic risk a company faces. In the following we 
present estimation results from alternative specifications of our regression model which account for 
these factors. 
Table 2 summarizes IV regression results based on our preferred specification (5) in Table 1 
estimated on separate samples split by, respectively, the average size of corporations within groups 
and our measure for economic risks. Given the relatively small size of our pseudo panel, we simply 
differentiate between “small” and “large” corporation size defined by the median of the average 
amount of capital measured at the start of our observation period. Likewise, we split the sample into 
a group with the variation coefficient of sales below (“low risk”) and above the median (“high 
risk”).   
Dividing the sample into sub-samples with average capital, respectively, below and above the 
median  we  find  that  the  leverage  elasticity  for  groups  with  relatively  large  corporations  is 
substantially larger (point estimate of 0.78) compared to the one for the sub-sample with relatively 
small companies (0.27). This difference is statistically significant at the 10% level (t-value=1.73). 
This result is consistent with the hypothesis that small corporations with relatively little capital can 
only take limited tax advantage of debt financing because of credit constraints, whereas large firms 
do not face this constraint and can make full advantage of debt financing for tax purposes. Gordon 
and Lee (2001), by contrast, do not find a significant effect of the firm size on the elasticity of 
corporate debt. Their estimate for the elasticity of debt is between 0.14 and 0.21 for the largest and 
the smallest firms.  
Splitting  the  sample  into  industries  by  the  level  of  economic  risks  yields  a  slightly  higher 
leverage  elasticity  for  corporations  with  a  below-average  risk  level  compared  to  those  with  a 
relatively high level, but this difference is not statistically significant. The direct effect of the risk 
measure on the corporate debt ratio is now only statistically significant in the sub-sample with a 
                                                 
28 There are two qualifications to this result, however: First, because the variation coefficient of sales is derived from 
the VAT statistics 1998 to 2005, it excludes exports which are not liable to VAT. Since the VAT statistic is the only 
data source available at a level of aggregation required to match the variation coefficient to our pseudo panel, we 
cannot adjust the variation coefficient for export shares. This data limitation should not matter as far as export shares 
have not changed between 1998 and 2005. Second, sales in post-reform years are also used to calculate our risk 
measure, which may induce correlation with the error term in the regression equation. To account for measurement 
error or potential endogeneity bias we have also estimated the regression without the variation coefficient of sales and 
found  that  the  estimated  tax  elasticity  remains  unaffected  whether  we  include  the  variation  coefficient  or  not. 
Estimation results for this specification are available on request.      17 
below-average  risk  level.  This  corroborates  the  finding  that  firms  in  risky  industries  are  more 
conservative in the use of debt (Graham 2000). 
Table 2:  IV regression results explaining the relationship between changes in financial leverage and 
the effective tax rate by size and risk 
Dependent variable: log(debt ratiog,2001/debt ratiog,1998) 
    by size    by risk 
    small  large    low risk  high risk 
    (1)  (2)    (3)  (4) 
log(ETRg,2001/ETRg,1998)    0.274 
(0.201) 
0.776 




share of corporations under the tax credit 
method 
  -0.212 
(0.313) 
-0.738 




change in the number of corporations in 
the group 
  0.256 
(0.075) 
-0.026 




dummy  indicating  groups  with  firms 
located in Western Germany only 
  0.045 
(0.032) 
-0.216 




variation coefficient of sales / standard 
deviation of the variation coefficient 
  -0.063 
(0.026) 
-0.084 




log(equityg,1998)    -0.007 
(0.041) 
-0.022 




change  in  the  share  of  firms  reporting 
non-negative AGI 
  0.075 
(0.378) 
-1.570 




constant    0.183 
(0.571) 
0.650 




Number of observations    515  514    514  515 
Notes:  “Size” is measured by the average capital stock, “risk” by the standardized variation coefficient of sales. The 
instrument for log(ETRg,2001/ETRg,1998) is log(PETRg,2001/ETRg,1998) with PETRg,2001 the simulated ETR as 
described  in  the  text.  Heteroskedasticity-consistent  robust  (Huber-White)  standard  errors  are  reported  in 
parentheses. 
Sources:  Own calculations based on German Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the Länder, corporate 
income tax statistics 1998 and 2001, value added tax statistics 1998 to 2005, local business tax statistics 1998 
and 2001. 
 
4.3 Tax effects by other tax shields  
As suggested by the “substitution hypothesis”, other corporate tax shields, such as depreciation 
allowances  and  tax  loss  carry-forwards,  may  substitute  for  debt  and  thus  affect  the  financial 
leverage  elasticity  with  respect  to  the  tax  rate  (see  section 2).  In  the  following  we  test  for 
differences  in  tax  effects  on  financial  leverage  with  respect  to  the  availability  of  depreciation 
deductions  and  unused  tax  loss  carry-forwards.  Our  measure  of  the  availability  of  depreciation 
allowances  is  the  ratio  of  depreciation  allowances  to  fixed  assets.  Table 3  summarizes  the 
estimation results for these alternative specifications of our basic regression model. As before all 
specifications start from the specification with the full set of control variables as given by column 
(5) in Table 1.  To avoid the potential endogeneity of  changes in the  ETR and our measure  of 
heterogeneity, these variables are all measured at the start of our observation period in 1998. Given 
the relatively small size of our pseudo panel, we again simply differentiate between groups below 
and above the median of our heterogeneity variable.     18 
Estimation results accounting for differences in the availability of depreciation allowances show 
that  the  elasticity  of  the  debt  ratio  is  lower  for  industries  that  already  benefit  from  generous 
depreciation allowances. For them, the estimation results imply a leverage elasticity of about .15, 
which is not statistically significant even at the 10% level, compared to a large and statistically 
significant elasticity of .72 for industries with less generous depreciation allowances.
29 Thus, our 
estimation results confirm the substitution hypothesis with respect to depreciation allowances acting 
as an alternative tax shield to debt.   
Table 3:  IV regression results explaining the relationship between changes in financial leverage and 
the effective tax rate by the availability of other tax shields  
Dependent variable: log(debt ratiog,2001/debt ratiog,1998) 
    ratio of depreciation 
allowances to equity  
(in 1998) … median 
 
ratio of tax loss carry-
forward to equity  
(in 1998) … median 
    below  above    below  above 
    (1)  (2)    (3)  (4) 
log(ETRg,2001/ETRg,1998)    0.722 
(0.273) 
0.147 




share  of  corporations  under  the  tax  credit 
method 
  -1.068 
(0.517) 
0.314 




change in the number of corporations in the 
group 
  -0.030 
(0.107) 
0.273 




dummy indicating groups which exclusively 
contain firms located in Western Germany 
  -0.132 
(0.055) 
0.013 




variation coefficient of sales / standard 
deviation of the variation coefficient 
  -0.083 
(0.029) 
-0.010 




log(equityg,1998)    -0.025 
(0.031) 
0.043 




change in the share of firms reporting non-
negative AGI 
  -1.158 
(0.562) 
-0.158 




constant    0.652 
(0.527) 
-0.555 




Number of observations    514  515    515  514 
Note:  The instrument for log(ETRg,2001/ETRg,1998) is log(PETRg,2001/ETRg,1998) with PETRg,2001 the simulated ETR as 
described  in  the  text.  Heteroskedasticity-consistent  robust  (Huber-White)  standard  errors  are  reported  in 
parentheses. 
Sources:  Own calculations based on German Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the Länder, corporate 
income tax statistics 1998 and 2001, value added tax statistics 1998 to 2005, local business tax statistics 1998 
and 2001. 
 
As the estimation results in columns (3) and (4) of Table 3 show, the substitution hypothesis is 
also confirmed with respect to the amount of unused tax loss carry-forwards: tax changes have a 
much stronger effect on the financial leverage for corporations with unused tax loss carry-forwards 
below the median (.83) than for those with relatively large tax loss carry-forward (.30); for the latter 
                                                 
29 A formal statistical test on the pooled sample yielded a t-statistic of -1.97 (p-value = 0.049) for the interaction term 
between the tax variable and a dummy variable for the two groups, where all other control variables were interacted 
with this group dummy.       19 
sub-sample the leverage elasticity is not statistically different from zero even at the 10% level.
30 We 
would expect that financial leverage in industries with substantial tax loss carry-forward is less 
responsive to changes in the ETR than those without such a tax shield for two reasons. First, tax 
loss carry-forwards can be used without time limit but are not interest bearing, which implies that 
they are devaluated over time. The prospect of not being able to use the whole of tax deductions 
provided by interest payments should cause corporations to limit their leverage. Second, a tax loss 
carry-forward already establishes a tax shield which renders debt less attractive as a tax shield. 
 
5  Conclusion 
In this paper we have estimated the elasticity of the financial leverage, as measured by the ratio 
of debt to total equity at the corporate level, with respect to the effective corporate tax rate, ETR, on 
the basis of tax return data for the German corporate sector and an instrumental variable approach to 
control for the endogeneity of the ETR. An important advantage of the tax return data used in this 
study is that they allow us to calculate the ETR taking into account various other tax shields, in 
particular loss carry-forward which has become of major quantitative importance for the corporate 
sector also in the German economy. As our instrument for the observed ETR we have used the 
counterfactual ETR a corporation would face in a particular period had there be no change of the 
corporation’s  capital  structure  within  that  period.  This  counterfactual  is  obtained  from  a 
microsimulation model of the corporate sector based on tax return data for 1998 and 2001. This 
period  saw  the  introduction  of  a  substantial  tax  reform,  which  provides  sufficient  exogenous 
variation  in  effective  tax  rates  across  corporations  to  identify  the  elasticity  of  corporate  debt. 
Statistical tests strongly indicate that our instrument is highly correlated with the change in the 
actually observed ETR and that the well-known weak instrument problem does not invalidate our 
instrumental variable estimation.  
Our  preferred  specification  of  the  relationship  between  the  financial  leverage  and  the  ETR 
yields an average elasticity of about 0.5. This estimate implies that a reduction of the (proportional) 
statutory corporate tax rate by 10 percent would reduce corporate debt by 5 percent. Compared to 
previous studies estimating tax effects on corporate capital structure, this indicates fairly strong tax 
effects on the corporate leverage. Our average elasticity estimate also indicates that the response of 
the corporate tax base to changes in the effective tax rate in Germany, as obtained in recent work by 
Dwenger and Steiner (2008), is to a large extent driven by changes in corporate leverage.  
Our estimation results regarding the availability of other tax shields provide strong evidence for 
the substitutions hypothesis: the financial leverage of corporations with less generous depreciation 
                                                 
30 In a pooled regression with all variables interacted by the group dummy, the value of the t-statistic for the interaction 
term between the tax variable and a dummy variable for the two groups is -1.67 (p-value = 0.096).     20 
allowances or with a low level of unused tax loss carry-forward is more responsive to tax changes 
than for corporations that can take more advantage of these various other tax shields. Our estimation 
results  are  also  consistent  with  the  hypothesis  that  the  debt  ratio  is  less  responsive  for  small 
companies  which  may  have  less  opportunity  to  use  debt  as  a  tax  shield  due  to  capital  market 
restrictions. However, although the financial leverage seems to be higher in industries with more 
stable  sales,  we  could  not  find  evidence  supporting  the  hypothesis  that  tax  effects  are  more 
important in less risky industries.  
Overall,  our  empirical  results  clearly  show,  for  the  Germany  economy,  that  the  corporate 
income tax affects the capital structure of corporations, and that tax effects differ by corporate size 
and the availability of other tax shields. The magnitude of our elasticity estimates suggests that 
recent  tax  reforms  which  reduced  statutory  corporate  income  tax  rates  may  have  led  to  a  less 
distorted capital structure in Germany. Although it remains unclear to what extent these results can 
be generalized to other countries, the empirical elasticity estimates provided in this paper could also 
be used to evaluate inefficiencies caused by the preferred tax treatment of debt over equity finance 
(see Weichenrieder and Klautke 2008).  
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A2:  Components of the corporate income tax assessed 
Sales 
-   deductions such as interest payments and depreciation allowances 
+/-   (...) 
Profit as shown in tax balance sheet 
+/-   correcting entry concerning valuation                (adjustment 
of values of balance sheet items, non tax deductible losses and non tax relevant gains etc.) 
+  correction of activities that are related to shareholders (declared profit distributions and constructive dividends, 
repayment of capital or capital increase, hidden contribution and other deposits under company law) 
+   non-deductible operating expenses                (especially 
taxes paid, 50 percent of payment to members of the supervisory board, penalties) 
+/-   non tax relevant domestic increases and decreases in net worth (inter-company dividends, investment subsidies 
etc.) 
+/-   corrections related to double taxation agreements, tax legislation relating to non-residents, and fiscal units 
=   Total Revenue 
-   allowable deductions for agriculture and forestry 
-   deductible donations and contributions 
+/-  income generated by fiscal subsidiaries 
=   Adjusted Gross Income 
-   loss carry-over and loss carry-back 
=   Net Income  
-  allowable deductions for non-incorporated firms and for commercial cooperatives 
=   Taxable Income  
*   statutory tax rate 
-  tax credits for foreign-source income 
=   Corporate income tax assessed     24 
A3:  Descriptive statistics  
  1998  2001  D  %D 
Debt in 1,000 € (average) 





(8,845.35)  13.32 





(8,896.48)  5.37 
Equity in 1,000 € (average) 





(15,031.98)  -4.83 





(13,907.14)  -3.09 
Debt ratio (average) 





(0.128)  1.47 
Adjusted Gross Income (AGI) in 1,000 € (average) 





(1,423.36)  -19.16 





(2,354.43)  -23.43 





(0.076)  1.08 
Effective Tax Rate (average) 





(0.0294)  -46.69 
Potential tax loss carry-forward in 1,000 €  (average) 





(2,201.18)  3.74 
  corporations with tax loss carry-forward at 




(6,953.57)  -  - 







(0.051)  - 273.34 
Share  of  groups  which  exclusively  contain 






(0.000)  0.00 





(0.050)  - 3.58 
variation coefficient of sales normalized by its 
standard deviation                            
0.985 
(1.000)  -  -  - 
ratio depreciation allowances to equity  
(average in 1998) 
0.356 
(0.460)  -  -  - 
ratio tax loss carry-forward to equity  
(average in 1998) 
0.215 
(0.272)  -  -  - 





(262.27)  10.79 
Number of corporations  
  all corporations  701,971  809,641  107,670  14.27 
  corporations with non-negative AGI  436,439  519,856  83,417  17.49 
  corporations with positive AGI and without 
tax loss carry-forward  243,364  280,155  36,791  14.08 
 
corporations with tax loss carry-forward at 
the beginning of the year  354,471  404,524  50,053  13.21 
Notes:  All information is given on the aggregate level. Standard deviations of variables are given in parentheses. %D 
is calculated as difference between logs, i.e. %DAGI=log(AGI2001)-log(AGI1998). 
Source:  Own calculations based on German Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the Länder, corporate 
income tax statistics 1998 and 2001, local business tax statistics 1998 and 2001.  
     25 
A4:  First stage of the IV regression 
Dependent variable: log(debt ratiog,2001/debt ratiog,1998) 
  (1)  (2) 




share of corporations under the tax credit method  -  0.771 
(0.155) 
change in the number of corporations in the group  -  0.120 
(0.035) 
dummy indicating groups which exclusively contain firms 
located in Western Germany  -  0.018 
(0.020) 
variation coefficient of sales / standard deviation of the 
variation coefficient  -  0.029 
(0.009) 
log(equityg,1998)  -  0.073 
(0.006) 
change in the share of firms reporting a positive AGI  -  0.727 
(0.155) 





2  0.188  0.319 
Number of observations  1,029  1,029 
F-Statistic  237.59  68.31 
Partial R²   -  0.153 
Notes:  Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Calculations of the Partial R² are described in Shea (1997) and 
Godfrey (1999). 
Sources:  Own calculations based on German Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the Länder, corporate 
income tax statistics 1998 and 2001, value added tax statistics 1998 to 2005, local business tax statistics 1998 
and 2001. 1 
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